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ACCOUNTING FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: THE RESOURCE-
BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM AND THE LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE 
ABSTRACT
The paper uses accounting concepts to assist the field of strategic management in its 
search for a theory of value, competitive advantage and superior profitability. 
Specifically, it argues that the resource-based view of the firm requires a labour 
theory of value creation. Using the Circuit of Capital as an organizing framework the 
paper integrates RBV and Marx's value theory, by introducing the notion of value as 
socially necessary labour time, into the analysis of resource based advantage.  This 
enables us to identify the impact of particular sources of competitive advantage as 
they become diffused through an industry. Some resource based advantages, when 
eventually imitated lead to an overall reduction in industry profitability, and other 
advantages lead to increases in industry average profitability.
Key words:
value creation, resource based view, labour theory of value, industry profitability
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INTRODUCTION
An important problem in the strategic management literature is to establish linkages 
between managerial actions and their consequences in terms of measurable outcomes. 
In one strand of this literature in particular, the resource based view (RBV) there is an 
explicit acknowledgement that the theory cannot be fully developed without reference 
to a consistent and complete theory of value (Miller and Shamsie, 1996, p.539;
Makadok and Coff, 2002). Although there have been significant contributions in the 
critical accounting literature to the problem of value (Tinker, 1980, Bryer, 1994), 
which might assist in this respect, thus far there has been little interaction between the 
accounting and strategic management literatures. Both literatures are rooted in the 
classical traditions of Marx and Ricardo, and in view of this commonality, rather than 
add to the weight of critique of the RBV (for example and a summary see Priem and 
Butler, 2001),  this paper assesses whether the RBV can be developed from a more 
rigorous application of its too often unacknowledged intellectual origins. The purpose 
of this paper is to propose an integration which offers the opportunity of a theory of 
competitive advantage consistent with a theory of value.
The field of strategic management concerns itself with identifying strategies
that allow some firms to produce ‘super-normal’ profits. From the 1980s the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation economics 
dominated the field, which explained how competitive advantage derives from 
privileged market positions. Following Porter (1980) the strategy problem could be 
decomposed into decisions about 1) where to compete, as some markets are more 
structurally attractive to incumbent firms than others; 2) how to compete, which 
involves a basic choice between two alternative ‘generic strategies’; and 3) strategy 
implementation.
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From the early 1990s an alternative explanation of superior profit performance 
emerged, labelled the resource-based view (RBV). The RBV locates the sources of 
advantage inside the firm and views the firm as a bundle of resources (Barney 1991; 
Rumelt, 1984; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Carter and Mueller, 2006). Resources that 
are simultaneously valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable earn the firm rents 
in equilibrium. The RBV argument can be traced back to Selznick’s (1957) idea of 
‘distinctive competences’ and on Penrose’s (1959), who perceived  the firm as a 
collection of resources, and that performance depends on its ability to use them. 
The RBV could be said to dominate discourse in the strategy field, and it has 
spawned other sub-fields like the knowledge-based view of the firm (e.g. Kogut and 
Zander 1992; Grant, 1996), which focuses specific attention on knowledge resources, 
and the dynamic capabilities literature (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000), which explores how firms can sustain resource-based advantages in
rapidly changing environments. However, there are problems with the theory. For 
example, it can be argued to be tautological as we cannot know whether a firm has 
unique capabilities independently of the description of them (Priem and Butler 2001; 
Carter et al, 2008). There are problems in empirically identifying unique resources: it 
is particularly difficult to attribute, unambiguously, superior performance to specific 
activities or assets. Moreover, resources occur in configurations with complex 
interaction effects between resources, some synergistic, others conflicting. And as a 
theory of competitive advantage, the RBV has little advice to offer managers, and, to
date, there has been little empirical work into how resources come about.
But rather than address these and other problems with the RBV we focus here 
on the question of value and what ‘valuable’ might mean in the RBV. We would 
suggest that although the RBV is concerned with the role of valuable assets, it does 
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not have a theory of value, and is unlikely to find one from the neo-classical 
perspective that dominates the field. Instead, when not relying on conventional 
economic theories of market imperfection, the RBV uses Ricardian rents to explain 
excess profits (for example, Barney, 1986, Conner, 1991, Makadok, 2001, Peteraf, 
1993, Wernerfelt, 1984) as part of a taxonomy of rent earning opportunities (Peteraf, 
1994) These Ricardian RBV perspectives utilise the notions of inelastic factor supply 
or heterogeneous resource picking skills. In these respects, they are manifestations of 
classical Ricardian approaches, but which ignore the neo-Ricardian approach. This is 
surprising since Sraffa’s, (1960) neo-Ricardian theory offers an explanation of wages, 
profits and prices, consistent with Marx’s first volume of Capital, all of which are 
potentially important to the establishment of a resource-based theory of the firm.
Sraffa’s analysis offers a useful starting point, but only insofar as it explains the 
technical relationships between these categories in a homogeneous commodity-based 
economy. In the RBV heterogeneous processes of value creation are all important
and, as in Marx’s more general analysis, a function of social relationships. 
` In the critical accounting literature, there has been much discussion of how 
accounting is implicated in the policing of the social relations of production. There 
has also been much discussion of the nature of value, how it is measured and its 
relation to the rate of profit (Tinker, 1980, Bryer, 1994, Toms, 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 
2009b). There has also been some development of practical accounting techniques to 
deal with the analysis of competitive advantage, although typically these have not 
incorporated the RBV (see for example Roslender and Hart, 2003). 
What is needed therefore is a model incorporating a robust theory of value, 
thereby explaining different profitability outcomes in different competitive situations. 
Such a model is presented below in the remainder of the paper, which is structured as 
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follows. We begin with a summary of the RBV that concludes that there is sufficient 
scope within the view to justify the introduction of an explicit labour theory of value 
perspective. Then we compare in broad outline the RBV and Marx’s labour theory of 
value and conclude that there are important and fundamental similarities between the 
theories. We then set out a critical component of Marx’s theory, the Circuit of Capital. 
We use the notation of the circuit to explore four primary types of resource creation 
process. The processes of profit rate equalization are then considered, and we explore 
what happens to average industry profitability when these resource advantages are 
imitated. We explain that some types of resource advantage when diffused throughout 
the industry lead to average profits falling, whilst other resource advantages, when 
copied, lead to increases in average profitability. Finally propositions are set out that 
capture the essential arguments of the paper. 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE RBV
Recent literature has recognised the need for a theory of value, and, as a result, two 
quite narrow and to some extent mutually exclusive perspectives have emerged. One 
strand examines processes within the organisation (Denrell et al., 2003), addressing 
value creation through adaptive learning, whilst another considers market interactions, 
particularly the division of value through bargaining games (Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003a, 2003b). The first perspective concentrates on the role of human activity in 
creating competitive advantage, but without reference to a value creation process. The 
second perspective sets out some theoretical problems with the neoclassical 
underpinnings of the RBV, and puts forward an alternative, the bargaining and 
payments perspectives, which offer a theory of rent and value distribution, but again 
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without considering the process of value creation. In another example of this 
approach, value is merely a function of market structure, or the presence of a willing 
buyer (MacDonald and Ryall, 2004). 
To develop these interpretations further a theory which reconciles value 
creation and value distribution is necessary. Recent literature has begun to explore 
this possibility. Using the distinction between separable, typically physical, and 
embedded resources, or assets, which include brand value, processes and procedures,
Bowman and Swart (2007) usefully extend the Lippman and Rumelt (2003a) 
bargaining perspective to inside the organisation. They develop a model to show the 
links between embedded capital, which is created from ambiguity surrounding the 
rent creating contributions of human capital, and the capture of rents thereby 
generated by owners, managers and employees, which depends on the extent to which 
assets are separable or embedded.i
Embedded capital is therefore a useful starting point for the analysis of 
profitability, and can be extended in a number of ways. First, the notion of embedded 
capital as a process is extended explicitly to include the labour process. Because it is 
concerned with power (for example Knights 1990) and not valorisation (Nicholls, 
1999), the potential contribution of labour process theory (LPT) to the RBV and 
theories of competitive advantage has been ignored. Knowledge and human capital 
assets are meanwhile regarded as sources of competitive advantage in the RBV and
elsewhere (Grant, 1996). If the LPT perspective is adopted the notion of knowledge 
workers as owners of capital (Drucker, 1993) can be abandoned. Using an LPT 
perspective, value creation occurs only in the labour process and not through social 
capital or similar osmosis. 
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A second important extension is therefore the adoption of the labour theory of 
value (LTV), and with it the idea of socially necessary labour.ii LTV provides a 
consistent explanation of the source of surplus, in the mental and physical actions of 
labour as a common component of all commodities, explaining why they are 
systematically sold at above the value of the other separable inputs. Third, embedded 
capital is not in itself sufficient to explain the distribution of surplus between workers, 
managers and shareholders. The outcome depends also on the processes of 
accountability, which begin with valorisation in the labour process. Here the 
management accounting system ascribes homogenous monetary values to 
heterogeneous outputs from the service delivery or production process. Because the 
process is less easily observable in the case of embedded capital, the probability of 
asymmetry between the social value of the labour expended and the realised monetary 
amount increases. In other words there is a greater probability that workers will 
appropriate rent by receiving the same wage through lower effort. Managers will 
therefore use the management accounting system to reduce information asymmetry 
whilst retaining the competitive advantage that embedded capital brings. They will 
appropriate rents themselves if successful, but their ability to do so will be influenced 
in turn by the transparency provided to owners through governance, audit and 
financial accounting. In this case the potential asymmetries are greater because 
investors are typically non-expert and in any case may mitigate risk through portfolio 
diversification rather than firm specific monitoring arrangements. Monitoring through 
internal and external accounting and governance processes is in itself a costly 
exercise, which reduces the availability of surplus to managers and outside investors.
Adding these three elements, labour process, labour theory of value and 
accounting process to the notion of embedded capital introduces Marx’s definition of 
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and theory of value into the RBV conversation. Gaining some clarity about what is 
meant by “value”, and by “valuable” resources within the RBV should lead to a 
strengthening of the perspective and should provoke some new lines of inquiry, some 
of which are pursued here. In particular, by introducing Marx’s concepts of value and 
surplus value we can explore the impacts of resource advantages as they become 
imitated, diffused through a set of close competitors. In this way we are able to effect
linkages between the firm level analysis of competitive advantage, and the analysis of 
relative industry profitability.
DEVELOPING THE RBV
Proponents of the RBV generally argue that human or 'cultural' resources are the 
sources of above normal returns, not purchasable and tradable physical assets 
(Barney, 1986; Castanias and Helfat, 1991). This is because physical inputs like 
computers or machinery can usually be purchased by competing firms, thus any 
advantage from buying a better piece of equipment is usually rapidly eroded, as 
competing firms are free to acquire the same equipment.  In contrast, valuable human 
resources such as specially skilled or talented employees, or resources that take the 
form of embedded tacit routines, tend to be difficult to replicate and can therefore 
enable the firm possessing these resources to sustain higher levels of profit. 
In most firms both the performance of valuable behaviours within the routines, 
social networks, and cultures of the organization (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and the 
direction and deployment of these resources with other inputs, are activities 
undertaken by hired employees, be they executives, middle managers or shop-floor 
workers.  This implies that sustained profitability derives from the actions of various 
types of labour working on and with other inert inputs (Lado and Wilson, 1994; 
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Pfeffer, 1995).  Thus, within resource-based theorizing the "resources" that produce 
rents are more likely to be human resources, rather than physical or inert resources.
RBV recognizes that resources can be built or bought. The deliberate creation 
of resources would also be a managerial activity, and the processes of resource 
creation executives enact have been described as dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997).  Unlike the Ricardian perspective, which relies only on artful procurement (or 
‘resource picking’, Makadok 2001), the dynamic capabilities perspective depends on 
the artful deployment of inert and human resources. In the first case surplus arises 
through the transfer of resource from one organisation to another. In the second case 
value is created through non-replicable management action as part of the labour 
process.
There are strong parallels between RBV reasoning and Marx's economics.  
Marx adopts a "human resource" based theory of value and surplus value.  His theory 
represents an advanced form of the labour theory of value developed by prior 
"classical" economists, notably Smith, Mill and Ricardo. In line with Marx's theory, 
the RBV explicitly acknowledges that the value created by a particular resource is not 
fully returned to the resource provider (Rumelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). The rents 
produced by the special resource have to be captured by the capitalist, not the 
resource provider or supplier, if super-normal profits are to accrue to the firm. Thus, 
RBV separates the creation of value from the capture of value: rents only lead to 
super-normal profits if they can be appropriated from the resource provider (Bowman 
and Ambrosini, 2000; Coff 1999). Marx's theory of value and profit also clearly 
distinguishes between value creation (exploitation in the labour process) and value 
capture (appropriation of profit). It is therefore fundamentally congruent with this 
basic tenet of the RBV.
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There are further important similarities between Marx's argument and the 
RBV. They both argue that super-normal profits result from the firm's possession of 
unique and valuable resources, and that the rent-generating or surplus-generating 
capacity of these resources may be temporary if these resources can be imitated:
"a manufacturer who employs a new invention before it becomes 
generally used, undersells his competitors, and yet sells his commodity 
above its individual value, that is realizes the specifically higher 
productiveness of the labour he employs as surplus labour. He thus 
secures a surplus profit." (Marx, 1954, III: 238) 
Both theories also recognize that the bargaining power of resource suppliers is a 
critical determinant of firm profitability. Marx argues that it is the capitalist's control 
over access to specific inanimate resources (the "means of production") that enables 
the exploitation of labour to take place.  Put another way, if individuals are able to 
earn a living by selling the products of their labour directly, rather than through 
selling their labour-power, then they have no need to contract with owners of capital.  
Exploitation can only take place where this alternative is denied the worker, and this 
is primarily the result of developments in what Marx terms the "forces of production" 
e.g. economies of scale.
According to the RBV, the physical assets that are the precursor of this 
relationship between capitalist and worker are unlikely to be the source of super-
normal profits.  As argued earlier, these assets, which are usually tradable and readily 
available, are likely to be common across competing firms.  But the problem is they 
are expensive.  They are expensive but not unique, and hence they do not qualify as 
resources, in resource-based thinking.  Access to these resources is rationed because 
of their costs of production, not because of their inherent uniqueness.  If these assets 
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became very cheap, then efficient scale production could be undertaken by individuals 
and self-organized groups without the involvement of the capitalist.  So capital, in its 
money form, is homogeneous, therefore, it cannot pass the test of a resource in the 
RBV.  However, capital enables its owner to capture surplus value, as it is required in 
all scale-sensitive areas of production.  If the required physical assets to produce, for 
example, steel, cars, or electricity were inexpensive, if they were within the reach of 
most people, then capital would have to retreat from these industries.  
So, in this sense, Marx's theory is also a resource-based theory. In his 
argument, the scarce resource is money capital. When this resource is rendered 
redundant because it is not required for socially efficient production, the people 
involved in creating new value are able to capture the full fruits of their labour.  Both 
theories deal with the phenomenon of entry barriers, but there is a crucial distinction 
between them.  In Marx's economics, the barrier to entry is primarily money capital: a 
sufficient sum of money must be advanced before socially efficient production can 
begin.  It is, then, a quantitative barrier to entry.  In the RBV, barriers to entry, or 
barriers to imitation exist which permit the firm to earn rents for sustained periods of 
time.  Here the barriers are typically qualitative: they consist of subtle differences in 
work process, reputations, and personal relationships that constitute the firm's rent-
generating resources. Although we would expect that most resources in the firm 
would be forms of labour in action, RBV also recognizes that inert inputs into the 
productive process can also be resources e.g. special equipment, a brand. However, 
these resources should be considered as intermediate use values involved in the 
productive process that are themselves the products of labour in action. Either the 
intermediate inert use value has been artfully procured, or it has been created by 
people inside the firm. If artful procurement creates resources for the firm this must 
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mean that the value of the resource in its current deployment is greater than the price 
that was originally paid for it.
The RBV offers an explanation of how firms can earn super-normal profits 
in equilibrium. The RBV is rooted in neo-classical thinking, where the notion of 
equilibrium forms a central plank of theory building. Thus equilibrium is a useful 
construct to assist in theory development, but we would not expect equilibria to exist 
in reality. Marx and Schumpeter (and other Austrian School economists) take a 
dynamic view of markets and economies, which taken at face value seems to be a 
more promising place to start building theories about relative firm performance. The 
processes of ‘creative destruction’, and Marx’s explanation of the ‘moral 
depreciation’ of capital recognise that competitive advantages have a limited shelf-
life. We believe the assumptions about equilibrium can be explained by the RBV’s 
neo-classical roots. Insights about the idiosyncratic sources of advantage the RBV 
provides are still interesting and important even if we relax the equilibrium 
conditions. Thus, in what follows we take a longer-run notion of competitive 
advantage than that implied by the RBV. Specifically, we assume that resource based 
advantages can exist at a point in time, but that processes of imitation and replication 
will, over time, lead to these resource advantages being eroded. So, we are relaxing a 
strict interpretation that resources are indefinitely non-imitable, suggesting instead 
that inimitability reduces over time. Such adjustments to resource advantage are 
mirrored by adjustments in socially necessary labour. The discovery of a new, more 
efficient system will reduce the socially necessary labour time to produce the same 
goods. The firm making the discovery enjoys competitive advantage because all other 
firms must employ labour above the socially necessary minimum. In the longer run, 
less well-endowed firms lose market share to the efficient firm and exit the industry, 
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or alternatively, the leading firm is imitated, so that the new social minimum is 
generalised to the industry.
Meanwhile, because there is embedded capital, causal ambiguity and 
information asymmetry, the division of surplus (including the transfer of rents from 
other firms as the leading firm gains market share) within the efficient firm is 
indeterminate. In this firm, monitoring costs are high to begin with as embedded 
capital is created, and these costs diminish through time as tacit knowledge in 
employees is generalised into managerial and other forms of explicit, but firm specific 
knowledge. Even at the end of the process, monitoring cost is greater than zero, 
therefore there is always a social minimum monitoring cost. From the point of view of 
capital, the realised rate of surplus across firms and industries is a function of the 
social minimum variable capital minus the social minimum monitoring cost. The 
latter is a cost of circulation, necessary for the functioning of capital but not a 
necessary production cost and does not therefore form part of society’s stock of 
valuable assets. 
Accounting labour, for example administration and bookkeeping are 
therefore classes of unproductive labour in circulation costs that act as deductions 
from profit (Marx, 1978, pp.207-211). To extend this notion into our analysis of 
profitability, it is necessary to extend the scope of socially necessary labour to include 
socially necessary labour costs in circulation. Whereas this labour is unproductive, 
since it arises from the social relations of production under capitalism, it is 
nonetheless required for capitalism to function so that the valorisation of the labour 
process can be completed through the realisation of money capital in the circuit of 
capital. There is accordingly a socially efficient level of labour required to sustain this 
process.
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Combining Marx's economics with the fine-grained insights into variations in 
firm-level profitability provided by the RBV enables us to develop a categorization of 
types of labour.  This can then be used to explain changes in firm profitability, and 
strategies employed to counter falling profitability, specifically how firms’ counter 
what Marx refers to as the "moral depreciation" of capital. Moreover, we can use this 
integration to explore the effects of resource imitation on industry profitability.
The basic arguments of the RBV have been set out above in the context of the 
current debate (Priem and Butler, 2001).  Marx's argument requires some integration, 
and in the next section we shall attempt to briefly summarize the aspects of his work 
most relevant to the RBV. His circuit of capital approach explains capital as a 
process, and it will provide the conceptual underpinning for the paper.
MARX'S "CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL"
---------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------
Figure 1 sets out the circuit of capital.  It has two spheres: the sphere of production 
and the sphere of circulation.  The circuit captures the essential aspects of the process 
of capital accumulation (Marx, 1954; Fine and Harris, 1979).  Marx employs three 
different types of ‘value’ in his argument: use value, exchange value and value. Use 
value refers to the physical or other properties of a commodity that provoke a demand 
for it; use value is product utility. Exchange value is the monetary value that the 
product exchanges for; it is value in its money form. Value refers to the labour time 
embodied in the commodity. Taking Marx’s macroeconomic perspective, value refers 
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to socially necessary labour in the abstract i.e. the labour is a portion of total labour 
deployed across the system as a whole.
In order to explain cases of heterogeneous labour productivity and resource 
endowment, the model begins with a simple benchmark describing homogeneous 
commodity production. In the benchmark case, the value rate of profit and money rate
of profit are equal, and this is also a useful base-case for the RBV, since firms earn 
the general rate of profit and there is no competitive advantage. Where market prices 
form the prices of production, non-Ricardian competitive advantage or disadvantage
depends on the difference between the money value of labour paid and the money 
value of socially necessary labour. Socially necessary labour is defined as the 
monetary equivalent of the required labour time in the most efficient firm. In the less 
efficient firm, rent accrues to labour at the expense of surplus in the form of wage 
payments above the socially necessary level. Because the labour process generates 
asymmetric information and monitoring costs attenuated by accounting controls the 
surplus appropriated even in the most efficient firm is lower that the total appropriable 
surplus. To the notion of Ricardian rents, therefore is added the notion of ‘labour 
rents’ which arise from the social productive process and whose magnitude is 
mediated by the effectiveness of accounting controls. For example a labour rent 
would arise inversely to lost profit where a worker takes more time for a task than the 
socially necessary required time. Individual firm profits are therefore heterogeneous 
as a function of combinations of standard RBV Ricardian rents, labour rents arising 
from differences in efficiency and labour rents arising from the ineffectiveness of 
accounting controls. The general rate of profit is formed through adjustments of 
money wages to the socially necessary equivalent through imitation; a process which 
is continually disrupted by new developments of dynamic capabilities. 
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The simple benchmark circuit begins with M, a sum of money advanced as 
capital.  In order for this capital to "self-expand", it has to be transformed into 
productive resources.  Thus, money capital, M, is converted into inputs, labour power 
(LP) and means of production (MP).  C is a sum of labour value made up of value 
"stored" in the machinery, and the value in the collection of wage goods required to 
"produce" the labourer. So C is a sum of value, a quantity of socially necessary labour 
time embodied in machinery etc. and wage goods.
The sum of value advanced procures two types of capital. The first is c, 
constant capital. It is constant because it cannot create more value than it already 
embodies. So the value embodied in the procured means of production MP remains 
constant through the productive process. In contrast, v is variable capital, as it has the 
capacity to create value and surplus value over and above the costs of its production, 
represented by wage goods. So labour power has the capacity to re-create the value 
advanced for wage goods i.e. it can produce sufficient new value to pay for itself, and 
it is also capable of producing surplus value. The working day is divided into the time 
spent on creating the sum of value advanced as wages (v) and the remainder of the 
day, which produces surplus value (s) procured by the capitalist. The ratio s to v Marx 
refers to as the rate of surplus value, or the rate of exploitation.
So MP and LP are joined in the process of production P. MP and LP are use 
values that combine to produce new use values in the form of commodities. Labour 
power working with the means of production (i.e. machinery, components, electricity) 
creates commodities with a value of C′.  These commodities then have to enter the 
sphere of circulation in order for the value and surplus value created in the production 
process to be realized.  The exchange of C′ for cash realises a quantity of money 
(M+m) where m represents the surplus value created in the production process, 
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appropriated by the capitalist in the form of profit. m is the monetary expression of 
surplus value. From m, the costs of circulation, including monitoring costs are 
deducted.
Thus the circuit begins with a sum of exchange value M. This is converted into 
the use values of labour power and the means of production. The value of these inputs 
is the socially necessary labour required to produce the means of production c and to 
“produce” the labourers v. In the production process new use values are created, a 
bundle of commodities which we shall label K subsequently, which have a value of C’ 
(which is the sum of c+v+s). When these are sold, the use values are exchanged for a 
sum of money M+m. 
Marx argues that m cannot all be frittered away on luxury consumption.  The 
external coercive laws of competition force the capitalist to reinvest m in an attempt to 
extend his ability to extract even more surplus value, and as a defensive measure to 
preserve the original value of M. Competition between capitals leads to ‘moral 
depreciation’ of the concrete means of production owned by the capitalist.  
Innovations in productive processes devalue past investments in machinery, and 
changing consumer tastes or product innovations can devalue the commodities (C') 
the capital can produce.  So re-investment is also a defensive necessity for the 
individual capitalist.  
We can now explore some dynamic processes within this circuit that affect the 
value of a particular capital.  First, we echo the concerns of RBV by exploring the 
case of super-normal profits.  Then we examine the processes that tend to bring about 
an equalization of profit rates within an industry.  
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Average Capitals
An average capital in a particular industry will be producing an average return.  Using 
the notation in the circuit of capital, and representing this as a process, we have:
mMsvcCKLPMPPvcCM  ),,('),(),(
Where, to recap, M is a sum of money advanced as capital that is converted 
into productive capital. C is a value construct, not a monetary amount. It represents 
the sum of labour time embodied in the constant capital c required for socially 
efficient production, and v, variable capital is the amount of value that makes up the 
sum of wage goods advanced for the labour time of the employees. Then the two 
procured components of capital, constant c and variable v combine in a productive 
process P.  c and v are now in the form of concrete or specific use values, the means 
of production MP, and labour power LP. The productive process produces 
commodities K which have a value of C´, which comprises the c used up in the 
productive process, the variable capital v employed, and surplus value s created in the 
production process. Again C´ is a value construct. If and when these products are sold 
they realize a sum of exchange value M+m where m is the monetary equivalent of the 
surplus value s created, minus the costs of circulation. 
In the average capital or firm in an industry, LP would consist of 
homogeneous labour power LPh, and homogeneous constant capital MPh. In other 
words the quality of labour and means of production is the average for the industry, 
and together they combine to produce average rates of profit: 
mMsvcCKLPMPPvcCM hh  ),,('),(),(
and the average monetary rate of profit earned by this firm would be: 
M
m
The average value rate of profit would be:
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vc
s

Throughout the following exploration we will assume that for the average 
capital in the industry the monetary rate of profit is equivalent to the value rate of 
profit i.e.
M
m
vc
s

We will then examine the case where individual capitals may have differing monetary 
and value rates of profit at a point in time.
Capitals Producing Super-Normal Profits
The RBV is concerned with capitals that are able to capture above-average profits, 
and we shall now use the circuit of capital to explore different forms of resource 
based advantage. In each case of resource advantage the created resource is valuable 
in conventional terms because it confers a per unit margin improvement relative to the 
average firm. Such advantage results from either lower relative unit costs or higher 
relative prices multiplied by the mass of commodities the capital produces. We start 
with the straightforward case of economies of scale.
Scale Advantage
Here the firm has achieved scale advantage ahead of competitors, as a result of the 
development of a new process. We can assume that this first mover advantage results 
from increases in the quantity of constant capital employed:
  mMsvcCKLPhMPPvcCM ),,('),(),(
where 
mmandCCKKMPMPCCMM   ,,,,
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Assuming that scale advantages do exist in this case, then additionally:
)()( MMmm  
We would expect that profits (m) from a previous circuit have been retained 
and invested in capital equipment (M+ converted into means of production MP+ that 
have a value of c+). The effect of this additional quantity of constant capital is to 
increase the productivity of labour power, which results in a higher volume of 
commodities produced in the circuit (K+) relative to the average capital (K). If we 
assume the market price for these commodities is set by the average capital, this scale 
efficient firm is able to capture additional profit due to its lower costs of production. 
The resource that has been created by this first mover investment in scale efficient 
processes and the value of this resource is the per unit margin improvement multiplied 
by the mass of commodities the capital produces.
However, if we inspect the changes in value dimensions a different picture 
emerges. Any investment in scale efficient equipment is an investment in constant 
capital. By definition constant capital cannot create more value than it embodies; it 
cannot create surplus value. The amount of surplus value created in this process 
remains the same as that in the average capital (s). How are we to account, then, for 
the additional profits earned? 
Marx was very aware of the processes of ‘creative destruction’. He uses the 
concept of socially necessary labour to capture the ongoing developments in 
processes that increase the productivity of labour. In the case of the scale efficient 
firm modelled here, the socially necessary amount of labour power required to 
produce this bundle of commodities has been redefined.  Those competing capitals 
that have not been able to imitate these scale efficient processes are now employing 
more labour power than is socially necessary.  As long as this persists the market 
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price of these commodities will be set by the average capital, enabling the RBV firm 
to sustain its superior rate of profit.  Of course, the scale efficient firm could choose to 
undercut its competitors, and maybe drive them out of business, but we will assume 
that the firm chooses to take the margin advantage.
So the first-mover’s investment in scale efficient production has had the effect 
of redefining the amount of socially necessary labour required to produce these 
commodities.  Thus although the surplus value created in the process remains the 
same as the average, the scale efficient capital is able to charge prices above the 
labour value embodied in the commodities it produces.  Prices reflect the average 
capital’s costs of production which now includes a proportion of socially unnecessary
labour time.
Assuming that scale economies do indeed lower the unit costs of each 
commodity the monetary rate of profit should increase even though more M has been 
advanced (M+) to fund the investments in equipment etc. But although the monetary 
rate of profit will have increased for this firm:
M
m
M
m 

the value rate of profit has declined:
vc
s
vc
s



We would not expect investments in scale efficient production to lead to 
sustained advantage, particularly where the scale efficient equipment is procured. 
Investments in bought-in machinery etc are likely to be readily imitated. The effects 
of other firms imitating this move would be the redefinition of the socially necessary 
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amount of labour required to produce these products. In the circuit the average
amount of constant capital will have increased from c to c+.  
The first mover achieving scale advantage has invested ahead of the 
competition. The obvious source of the additional M invested is the retained m from a 
prior circuit. This is essentially Marx’s process of accumulation. Because the 
investment is in explicit production processes and separable physical capital, m is 
reduced by circulation costs to only a minimal extent. But a consequence of this 
process of accumulation is an increase in the ratio of constant capital c to variable 
capital v. We consider some of the ramifications of this later in the paper.
We now turn our attention to three more typical sources of resource-based 
advantage. First we consider the situation where differentiated labour power creates 
intermediate use values that add to the efficiency or effectiveness of the firm’s capital. 
Intermediate use values are assets like special equipment, systems, brands, databases, 
and patents. As inert use values they form part of constant capital.
Intermediate Use Values
Differentiated labour (LPd) could create intermediate use values in a prior circuit of 
capital. Here the actions of labour have resulted in a qualitative improvement in 
constant capital (MP becomes MPd). So whereas Marx generally treats constant 
capital as homogeneous, constant capital with differential capabilities can be created 
internally within the firm by the actions of labour. We can represent this process of 
resource creation by setting out two sequential but abbreviated circuits of capital. 
Here differential labour creates better quality intermediate use values:
….  mMKLPMP dh ,   mMKLPMPM hd ,
circuit n           circuit n + 1
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But note that in circuit n some labour power has been diverted from the 
production of commodities to the development of superior intermediate use values 
like better systems, brands, equipment. These then confer advantage in subsequent 
circuits of capital n+1 etc. The process at work here is knowledge co-production with 
causal ambiguity so that MPd is embedded capital. However the ambiguity produces 
indeterminate pay-offs in the valorisation process. Three specific permutations can be 
considered as defining or limiting cases. In the first case, represented above, 
differential labour in the first circuit is transformed into homogenous labour in the 
second. In other words, the labour process is reorganised instantaneously so that the 
tacit knowledge in LPd is transferred into MPd as complex but separable capital that 
can be operated by homogeneous de-skilled labour. In this case profit accumulation 
proceeds smoothly and m is only diminished by the socially normal monitoring cost. 
Even so, the problem for capital is in the first circuit since there is no mechanism for 
translating LPd into the full value of m and the amount available for reinvestment in 
the second circuit necessary to create MPd is constrained. Therefore even in this 
limiting case, because value is created from skilled labour, suppliers of skilled labour 
always appropriate a positive rent in the first period when their labour is used in the 
co-production of knowl dge assets. The second case is the same, except that the same 
amount of LPd is also required in subsequent periods. In the third case monitoring 
mechanisms are insufficient to account immediately for the revised value generation 
arrangements in the labour process. As we go through each of the three cases it can be 
seen that the proportion of value appropriated as m diminishes, such that the likely 
outcome in case three is normal profit, as the extra value created through the new 
process approaches 100%. In all three cases the amount realised through m is 
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insufficient for accumulation purposes, and so the subsequent circuit requires 
supplementary investment from new capital.
As with the investment in scale efficient processes, the internal development 
of intermediate use values like better procedures, better equipment, patents etc results 
in an increase in constant capital c. These resource developments in circuit n become 
“dead labour” in circuit n+1. And as with the case of investments in procured 
equipment the augmentation of constant capital without any commensurate increase in 
the rate of surplus value (s/v) would result in a reduction in the value rate of profit, 
and again this is progressively accentuated in the three cases above. So although the 
co-production of knowledge assets creates the theoretical basis for competitive 
advantage, and indeed an actual advantage in the sense that rent-seeking employees 
and managers of other firms attempt to copy the leading firm’s state of the art 
working methods, the underlying value rate and the realised rate of profit remain 
normal.
Economizing on Constant Capital
A third source of resource advantage would be resources that enable the firm to 
increase the rate of capital turnover. Resources that might deliver this advantage may 
well be work methods that make better use of bought-in material and equipment. 
Although the same capital is advanced as under the previous less efficient method, the 
rate of realisation into M is speeded up, so that more capital turnovers are possible in 
a given time period. The effect is to increase the rate of profit. Examples might 
include the introduction of just-in-time (JIT) delivery systems. Again several 
scenarios are possible. In the part of the value chain administering JIT, the socially 
necessary labour in circulation costs falls. To see the overall impact however, the 
whole value chain must be considered. If the impact of the firm’s introduction of JIT 
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is that suppliers must hold more stock than previously, there is merely a reallocation 
of the aggregate value chain total profit through increased capital turnover in the 
customer firm and a corresponding reduction in the supplier. If on the other hand 
some technical process delivers improvements throughout the value chain, for 
example computerisation, the socially necessary labour in circulation costs falls and 
the aggregate capital turnover and rate of profit rises. The net effect depends on the 
relative scale of these processes and the bargaining power of firms in the value chain. 
A powerful firm will collect rents from weaker firms through trade-offs in the profit 
allocation process. If the vehicle for this diffusion process were consultants (e.g. SAP, 
MRP, QA, JIT systems) then firms buying the systems would be adding to their stock 
of constant capital c and the net effect would be to reduce the average rate of profit. 
Codification then also increases the possibility that these advantages can be replicated 
in rival firms. Procured systems like these would then be intermediate use values like 
those considered above.
“Bought” Resources
These procured systems could not be resources as they would confer equivalent use 
value to the firms that bought them. But resources can be bought. Since price differs 
from value, but price = value in the aggregate, it follows that resources can be bought 
at, above or below their true value. In the case where they are acquired at below 
value:
mMKsvcCPLPMPvcCM hh  ),,('),(),(
Here the sum advanced for socially efficient production M- is less than that 
advanced by competing capitals. So although the amount of value created is the same 
as in competing capitals (c+v+s), the exchange value advanced for the specific LP
and MP was less than that advanced in competing capitals. If as in the case of this 
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circuit the use values conferred by the procured inputs are equivalent to the use values 
of the average capital, then strictly this firm does not possess a resource advantage. 
The “resource” existed in a prior circuit and it consisted of special procurement 
expertise or insight. Again because the market price is set by the average capital this 
resource endowed firm is able to earn a superior rate of profit:
M
m
M
mmM  
 )(
But would it be possible to acquire true resources that have differential use 
value (i.e. acquire MPd or LPd)? The value of these resources would be the costs of 
their production, in labour time units. Although the specific use values of the procured 
MP and LP may be differentiated we have no reason to suppose that their values
would be any more or less than undifferentiated inputs procured by the average firm. 
Hence even in the case of the procurement of true resources the value rate of profit 
(s/(c+v)) may be the same for the resource-endowed firm as for the average firm. The 
RBV arrives at the same conclusion, since the ability to purchase implies imitability 
and hence normal profit.
There is a fourth form of resource based advantage that is more likely to be 
sustainable because it does not involve the creation of intermediate use values, and 
hence does not result in an increase in constant capital c. Advantage here derives from 
improvements in the rate of surplus value.
Increasing the Rate of Surplus Value
Marx defines the rate of surplus value, or the rate of exploitation as the ratio s/v. 
Resource-based advantages can be developed that operate directly on this ratio. Any 
improvements in learning, experience, skills etc that a firm can achieve ahead of 
competitors may have the effect of reducing the given quantity of v required to 
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produce the average quantity of commodities K. These improvements in productivity 
would not necessarily involve any investments or changes in MP, so c would not be 
augmented. Here the rate of surplus value has increased through resources that require 
less v for an average bundle of commodities K:
mMKsvcCPLPMPvcCM dh   ),,(),(),(
'
where 
v
s
v
s 
The actual improvement in the rate of profit depends however on the ability of 
management to observe v. In the earlier case we considered knowledge co-production 
and the limited opportunities for improvements in the labour process to accrue to s. If 
we now consider the case of increased organisational learning which comes purely 
from LPd, the problem of higher profit realisation is intensified. This case reflects 
increased tacit knowledge on the part of the skilled employee, which is by definition 
not directly observable. Faced with monitoring problems, management or external 
stakeholders might resort to action or output type control mechanisms (Ouchi and 
Maguire, 1975). Where the task is complex, the management accounting system 
therefore retreats from action and behaviour controls, since their application requires  
understanding a technical labour process from a non-technical point of view. Instead 
it relies on performance, or output control, so that the employee may set their own 
level of efficiency provided the target is met. Because the managers have no technical 
knowledge of the tacit process, they are forced to rely on their understanding of 
socially necessary labour when setting standard costs. Typically they will set these 
standards with reference to competitor firms or incrementally from historical practices 
in their own firm. In all scenarios of this kind, the employee appropriates the gain 
from improved tacit knowledge in rent, for example economy of effort for a given 
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wage. Even where managers can monitor the labour process and extract some surplus, 
the information asymmetry between them and their non-expert shareholders becomes 
all the larger, leaving shareholders with remote possibilities of surplus appropriation.
The amount of v required could be reduced in other ways, but these may be more 
imitable. For example, the length of the working day could be extended without a 
commensurate increase in wages.  Supervisory and quality control circulation costs 
could be reduced by having employees police their own behaviour, but self-policing is 
likely to reduce the value captured from the labour process. 
FALLING RATES OF PROFIT
We have seen that, in an effort to reduce costs, living labour (v) is replaced by "dead" 
labour (c) embodied in the means of production.  If the rate of exploitation (s/v) 
remains constant, then the increasing organic composition of capital has the overall 
effect of causing the rate of profit to fall.  This is Marx's ‘Law of the Tendency of the 
Rate of Profit to Fall’, an inherent tendency within the system that nevertheless can be 
moderated by "counteracting forces".  From the perspective of RBV, this process of 
increasing c/v could be explained as follows.
We have seen how economies of scale and the creation of intermediate use 
values can all lead to an increase in the organic composition of capital c/v. Ultimately 
the process of proceduralising and de-skilling can result in the process being 
performed by a machine. Here living labour LP is replaced first by LPd through 
organisational learning and knowledge co-production and then through deskilling LPd
is transformed into LPh and MP is transformed into MPd (where LPh < LP). 
Transparency, achieved through management accounting and financial reporting, 
speeds up the value capture process, but at the same time makes the changes more 
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easily imitable by other firms. Moreover, with imitation across the industry the net 
outcome is an increase in the organic composition of capital in that industry, relative 
to other industries: c+/v compared with c/v for other spheres of production, where 
c+c.  As surplus value can only be derived from the actions of living labour (v), if 
there is no corresponding increase in the rate of surplus value in the industry (i.e. s/v 
is average), then the rate of profit in this industry will decline: 
Rate of Profit = 
vc
s

If we divide through by v, then: 
Rate of Profit = 
1
v
c
v
s
And so, if c+/v for a particular industry is greater than average c/v, then the 
rate of profit in this industry will be lower than average, assuming no change in s/v:
v
c
v
c 

therefore the rate of profit in this industry is below average:
(a) 
11 



v
c
v
s
v
c
v
s
So the replacement of living labour with machinery, de-skilling and the 
creation of intermediate use values confers a temporary advantage on the firm that 
innovates first.  But, if these moves are imitated the result is an increase in the organic 
composition of capital in the industry, relative to others, and hence a declining rate of 
profit in this industry.  So the process of resource creation in these cases can lead to a 
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short-term advantage for the first mover, but the net effect of this process is to lower 
profit rates across the industry as this ploy is imitated.
To summarize, if the resource augments constant capital e.g. scale efficient 
equipment, or intermediate use values, the resource-endowed firm is able to sell its 
output above its value. If these resources then get imitated the result is that the value
rate of profit in the industry declines as the amount of constant capital has increased 
without any commensurate increase in surplus value (inequality (a) above). So the 
effect of resources that are capitalized is that once they are imitated the average rate 
of profit in the industry declines.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have used insights from Marx's economics to inform RBV, and RBV 
in turn has enabled us to develop certain aspects of Marx's schema. We have seen that 
the process of accumulation, which is at the heart of Marx's analysis and which we 
have explored in the circuit of capital, is capable of representing and accounting for 
many of the phenomena developed in the RBV. By introducing Marx’s concept of 
value we have been able to explore the effects on firm’s and industries of particular 
types of resource developments, how the value created from such developments is 
split between employees, managers and shareholders and how accounting mediates 
the split, and the impact on industry profitability if these are imitated. 
Direct empirical testing of the relationships outlined is possible for example 
by using realised profit rates to ascertain the most efficient firm and hence the socially 
necessary labour in any given industry sector. Moreover the categories used by Marx 
above have been shown to be consistent with conventional accounting categories 
(Bryer, 2005). Profit rates can be mapped over time for firms and industries, and 
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approximations to the value constructs c and v can be made using cost information. 
But further theoretical work is needed to explore the effects of introducing market 
dynamics, rates of resource diffusion, and entry barriers into the theory. Finally, there 
is a macro perspective that could be developed to consider these processes and 
tendencies at a system level. Even so, it is hoped that this paper represents a 
radicalisation of strategy and will assist in the development of future discussions of 
critical strategy as well as critical accounting.
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Figure 1: Circuit of Capital
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i Bowman and Swart (2007, p.1) define embedded capital as follows: ‘Embedded 
capital exists where there is ambiguity surrounding the rent creating contributions of 
human capital. This ambiguity is due to the interactions in the processes of value 
creation between capital that can exist in a form separated from individual employees, 
e.g. a codified procedure, and human capital that is embodied in individuals. These 
interactions are difficult to disentangle, and as a result it is not possible to clearly 
attribute the creation of value to the component parts of embedded capital’.
ii Marx recognizes that only necessary labour time is relevant to the determination of 
the value of a commodity. So, for example, just because I was a really slow worker 
and took twice as long as the average employee to make a chair, that chair would not 
be worth twice as much.
